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Abstract
Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for
the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)
hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty re-
garding the distribution of gains and losses resulting from a reform. In this paper,
we experimentally demonstrate that anti-reform bias arising from uncertainty is
mitigated by social preferences. We show that, paradoxically, many who stand
to lose from reforms vote in favor because they value efficiency, while many who
will potentially gain from reforms oppose them due to inequality aversion.
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1. Introduction
Efficiency-enhancing reforms1 are often deemed difficult to implement in demo-
cratic societies, because of uncertainty regarding how the gains and losses from
such reforms will be distributed among the electorate, together with the fact that
those that benefit from the status quo are in a stronger political position than
those who suffer (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; henceforth F&R). The aim of
the present paper is to explore whether reforms do, nevertheless, end up being
implemented because voters exhibit sociotropic preferences, that is, they do not
only care for their own pocket-books but are willing to put their own needs on
hold for the well-being of society (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Gomez and Wilson,
2001). In our laboratory experiment, the subjects vote on efficiency-enhancing
reforms, some of which involve ex-ante uncertainty over the ex-post distribution
of gains and losses. We show that voters pass many more reforms than predicted
under the assumption of pocket-book voting (and more than what is explicable
by noise), even though a majority expects to be worse-off following a reform. The
presence of efficiency preferences in the subjects significantly raises the likelihood
for a reform, whereas inequality aversion works in the opposite direction.
Our experiment is inspired by F&R’s prominent paper in which they illus-
trate how individual-specific uncertainty can give rise to a bias against efficiency-
enhancing reforms (“status quo bias” or “anti-reform bias”). F&R presuppose
that in a democracy, reforms need support from a majority of the electorate.
Under complete certainty, a reform will be accepted if the majority gains from
it, and rejected otherwise. The situation is different, however, if some voters
from an ex-ante perspective do not know whether they will gain or lose from a
reform, but only know the probability distribution of possible outcomes. In this
case, reforms that involve an expected loss to a majority may be rejected due to
individual-specific uncertainty, although they would be enacted without uncer-
tainty (Scenario A). Correspondingly, reforms from which a majority expects to
gain may be accepted with uncertainty, although they would be rejected without
uncertainty (Scenario B). Now, because uncertainty lifts only after the reform
1In line with the literature, we call a reform efficiency-enhancing if its monetary net benefits
are positive, that is, the Kaldor–Hicks criterion is fulfilled.
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has been enacted (which is more likely to happen in Scenario B), whenever there
is a “second vote or a chance to reconsider, the reform may be repealed” (F&R,
p. 1149). Consequently, an important structural difference exists between these
scenarios: Scenario-A reforms are unlikely to pass, in which case a majority would
persistently fail to reap the gain from reform. Scenario-B reforms, in contrast,
may be tried out; the majority therefore likely learns that they will in fact lose
from the reforms.
F&R’s ingenious analysis of political status quo bias rests upon two auxiliary
assumptions: risk neutrality and pocket-book voting. In this paper, we are pri-
marily concerned about the latter assumption, that is, we study the impact of
sociotropic preferences on status quo bias.2 Note that not all types of non-spiteful
other-regarding or social preferences are sociotropic: efficiency preferences clearly
are, but inequality aversion or Rawlsian maximin preferences can lead voters to
vote against reforms that are to their own material advantage. It follows that,
if the classes of reform gainers and losers are maintained at a constant size, the
effect of social preferences on voting for a reform depends on the relative fre-
quencies of different deviations from pocket-book voting in each class. This is a
fundamentally empirical issue that lends itself to experimental testing.
Models and experimental tests of inequality aversion were put forward by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and others. The model by
Charness and Rabin (2002) can also account for Rawlsian maximin preferences.3
The literature on social preferences suggests that a significant number of people
are potentially willing to sacrifice parts of their own income to help others even if
2We do not challenge the risk-neutrality assumption; its violation would have a remote im-
pact in any case. Risk-aversion would decrease the likelihood of reforms involving an expected
gain of being enacted and thus reduce the asymmetry between the scenarios; risk-loving would
symmetrically increase the likelihood of all reforms involving uncertainty to be enacted. For
further discussion and examples of the role of uncertainty in the political economy of a re-
form, see Rodrik (1996) and Tommasi and Velasco (1995). A formal model of uncertainty and
the adoption of economic reform was developed by Jain and Mukand (2003). Related time
inconsistency problems were discussed by Dixit and Londregan (1996).
3Such motives seem to resemble observations from the political economy of reform literature,
where it frequently appears unfair to consumers to make producers worse off in relation to the
status quo (e.g., Summers, 1994).
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their choices increase inequality, for instance, because they value efficiency or are
altruistic (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fisman
et al., 2007; Kerschbamer, 2013).4
While many contributions have studied social preferences in the context of
markets and games (for surveys, see Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Schmidt, 2003;
Sobel, 2005; Schmidt, 2011; Charness and Kuhn, 2011; Cooper and Kagel 2013),
few have dealt with their impact in the sphere of political decision-making. To
our knowledge, Cason and Mui (2003, 2005) are the only ones that have ex-
perimentally examined the dynamics involved with voting on a reform. These
authors extended F&R’s model by allowing for costly voter participation, and
found that uncertainty reduces the incidence of a reform even with costly polit-
ical participation. In contrast, we conduct an experiment to explore the role of
social preferences for voting on a reform and control for risk preferences.
While we are not aware of any study that accounts for the impact of social
preferences in voting upon an efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing re-
form, the case can be thought of as the reverse of voting on efficiency-reducing but
inequality-decreasing redistribution. From this viewpoint, we contribute a new
perspective to a recent wave of research exploring voting on redistribution, includ-
ing Beckman et al. (2002), Ackert et al. (2004), Tyran and Sausgruber (2006),
Durante and Putterman (2009), Sauermann and Kaiser (2010), and Balafoutas
et al. (2012). As their main result, these studies generally emphasize that voters
are willing to sacrifice their own income to achieve a more equal distribution. In
contrast, we investigate if voters are also willing to sacrifice their own income to
implement an efficiency-increasing but inequality-increasing reform. So far, the
literature provides an inconclusive picture of whether one motive outweighs the
other. Ho¨chtl et al. (2012) observed no evidence for voters to be efficiency-loving
and showed that inequality averse voters may not matter for redistribution out-
comes for empirically plausible cases. Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) investigated
the tradeoff between equity and efficiency motives in a voting game with three
voters. They found that twice as many voters were willing to give up their own
4The fact that people value efficiency is also reported by a related strand of literature
exploring preferences for principles of distributive justice (see Tausch et al., 2010, for a survey.)
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income in favor of an equal distribution compared to a more efficient but unequal
distribution. This observation suggests that social preferences hinder the enact-
ment of efficient reforms. Messer et al. (2010) studied the impact of majority
voting on the provision of a public good. They detected substantial concerns
for efficiency in the subjects’ behavior, but found little support for inequality
aversion and maximin preferences.
In our experiment, we elicit the subjects’ social preferences using the double
price-list technique developed by Kerschbamer (2013) and applied, for example,
in Balafoutas et al. (2012). We let the subjects vote on the four types of reforms
discussed by F&R (majority better-off/worse-off vs. certainty/uncertainty about
distribution of gains and losses). In addition, we elicit the subjects’ risk attitudes
using a standardized lottery-selection design (see Holt and Laury, 2002, 2005).
The following were observed in the study‘s subjects: (i) efficiency preferences lead
the subjects to support reforms that are to their own disadvantage; (ii) inequality
aversion leads them to decline reforms that are at their own advantage; (iii) “noisy
play” (e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992) can explain some of the unpredicted
observations; (iv) the subjects are, on average, risk-neutral, and voting decisions
are not affected by risk preferences even in reform setups involving uncertainty;
(v) if the subjects believe that their vote is pivotal, they are more likely to reject
disadvantageous reforms; and (vi) status quo bias cannot be evidenced at the
group level.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the
experimental design. Section 3 derives formal hypotheses from F&R’s paper. In
Section 4, we present the results of our study. The results and concluding remarks
are discussed in Section 5.
2. The Experiment
The experiment involved three steps, which were handled in the following
order: (i) social-preference elicitation task, (ii) voting on a reform proposal, and
(iii) elicitation of risk attitudes. All tasks involved financial incentive mechanisms.
The experiment was concluded by a complementary questionnaire to assess the
subjects’ demographic data and subjective risk attitudes. We explain the main
task of the experiment– the voting (ii)– in the next subsection. Parts (i) and (iii)
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have been adopted from the literature and will be briefly described in Subsection
2.2. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Subject recruitment was done using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
Instructions and sample screens can be seen in the Appendix.
2.1. Voting on Reform
The treatment structure of the experiment (Table 1) exactly replicates the
reform scenarios introduced by F&R in order to illustrate their reasoning. Re-
form Scenario A leaves a majority better-off following a reform from an ex-post
perspective. However, another majority is expected to vote against the reform
because they believe it entails a negative value for them. This is called the Ex-
pected Loss Treatment (A:EL). Reform Scenario B makes the majority worse-off
following a reform from an ex-post perspective, but again, another majority is
expected to vote for the reform from an ex-ante perspective because it entails a
positive expected value for them. This is called the Expected Gain Treatment
(B:EG). F&R described two additional situations that resemble the A:EL and
B:EG scenarios, except for removing all uncertainty. That is, in the Certain Gain
Treatment (A:CG), the majority definitely knows that it would win following the
reform, and in the Certain Loss Treatment (B:CL), the majority definitely knows
that it would lose following the reform.
Insert Table 1 here.
The scenarios were investigated using 16 groups of five subjects each. We
conducted four separate sessions with four groups per treatment. The subjects
were randomly assigned to treatments and groups. The five subjects comprising a
group had to vote for or against a reform by a simple majority vote. The subjects
learnt the outcome of the vote before they could reconsider the reform in a second
vote, i.e., all subjects voted twice. In case the subjects accepted the reform in the
first vote, uncertainty was resolved. Votes were simultaneously and anonymously
cast, payoffs were affected in private, and the outcome of only the second vote
was paid out. Hence, there were four possible outcomes: (i) the reform passed
neither in the first nor the second vote, (ii) the reform was adopted in the first
vote but revoked in the second; (iii) the reform was not passed in the first vote
6
but was adopted in the second, and (iv) the reform was adopted in the first vote
and sustained in the second.
Insert Table 2 here.
Table 2 shows the experimental parameters and how the treatments were im-
plemented. The subjects were randomly assigned one of the two roles. The G-role
promised a subject a certain gain if the reform was adopted. The L-role burdened
a subject with losses if the reform was adopted; however, in the treatments involv-
ing uncertainty (A:EL, B:EG), one L-player in each group turned into a G-player
after the reform.5 However, L-players did not know in advance who would be
chosen. In the treatments with certainty (A:CG, B:CL), no role change was
possible. Pre-reform incomes– the players’ initial endowments– amounted to 240
points each and were identical for both roles (see the first row of the table).
Later, 100 points were converted into 4 Euros. Post-reform incomes– the players’
payoffs– were determined by the subjects’ roles in the respective treatments. Ev-
ery reform involved an increase in group efficiency (in terms of the Kaldor–Hicks
compensation criterion) of 20% from 1200 to 1440 points.
In each panel of Table 2, the first row indicates the roles assigned to the five
group members, their post-reform incomes, and the (expected) income change
with respect to the pre-reform incomes. In A:EL, the incomes of the three
L-subjects drop to 171 points, except for the single L-player who becomes a G-
player. Her income is lifted to 366 points to match the incomes of the other two
G-players. Since the treatment involves uncertainty about who will turn into a
G-player, the expected loss of L-players is (−69× 2 + 126)/3 = −4 points. The
respective numbers for the A:CG treatment are stated in the panel below. The
Certain Gain Treatment is a control treatment for the Expected Loss Treatment.
The uncertainty with respect to the L-player who would turn into a G-player
after the reform is resolved, and it is obvious that the majority would be better-
off following the reform. The lower two panels give the respective numbers for
the B scenarios. Here, we have a positive expectation for the four L-players in
5In order to keep the instructions to the subjects neutral, we called the L-players “blue”
players and G-players “green” players.
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the Expected Gain Treatment (B : EG) of (−3 × 69 + 224)/4 ≈ 4 points, and
they realize a loss of −69 points. G-players and the single L-player who turns
into a G-player after the reform increase their incomes to 464 points. Below, the
B:CL treatment shows that there are three certain losers who lose 69 points each
if the uncertainty is resolved. Hence, the Certain Loss Treatment is a control
treatment for the Expected Gain Treatment.
At the beginning of the voting task, the subjects were carefully instructed (use
of the computer interface, group structure and roles, own role, uncertainty with
respect to L-players if applicable, pre- and post-reform payoffs), including the
fact that they would be asked to vote twice. Then, the subjects simultaneously
and anonymously cast their first votes.
• If the reform was not adopted, the subjects were informed about the neg-
ative outcome of the vote and asked to cast their votes again. If the re-
form was adopted in the second vote, uncertainty was resolved if applicable
(treatments A:EL and B:EG) and the subjects were informed of the posi-
tive outcome of the vote. Furthermore, in treatments involving uncertainty,
L-players were informed whether they turned into a G-player. Otherwise,
the subjects were informed that the reform definitely did not pass.
• If the reform was adopted in the first vote, the subjects were informed about
the positive outcome of the vote, and if applicable, uncertainty about L-
players’ role assignments was resolved. The subjects were then asked to
vote on whether they would like to repeal the reform. After the second
vote, the subjects were informed whether the reform was repealed.
At the end of the voting task, the subjects were informed about their individual
payoffs.
After the first vote, but before its outcome was revealed to the subjects, we
asked them to state their expectation about the number of other group members
that may have approved the reform. From the answers to this question, we
constructed a control variable termed “Pivotal”: if a subject’s answer to this
question was “2,” she expected her vote to be decisive for the group outcome and
we set Pivotal = 1; otherwise, we set Pivotal = 0.
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2.2. Elicitation of Social Preferences and Risk Attitudes
Each of the four reform scenarios involves a trade-off between equity and ef-
ficiency: G-players win more than L-players lose. F&R‘s reasoning relies on the
assumption of pocket-book voting. In order to test if the subjects’ voting behavior
is also affected by social preferences, we elicited our subjects’ social preferences
using the double price-list technique developed by Kerschbamer (2013) and ap-
plied, e.g., in Balafoutas et al. (2012).
The elicitation method engages subjects with two blocks of five binary choices
between different allocations. In the first block, the subjects have to decide be-
tween an egalitarian distribution of 100 points among themselves and another
random subject, that is, a 50 : 50 distribution, and an unequal distribution
50 + x : 65, where x ∈ {−10,−5, 0, 5, 10}. Obviously, the unequal distribution
increases efficiency from 5 up to 25 points (15±10), but involves disadvantageous
inequality for the decision maker.6 A rational subject switches at most once from
the egalitarian distribution (50 : 50) to the unequal distribution (50 + x : 65),
but never in the other direction. If a subject switches to the unequal distribution
before or at x = 0, she is willing to sacrifice her own income in order to increase ef-
ficiency. If she switches later, she is willing to tolerate disadvantageous inequality
only if being compensated for that. A measure of efficiency preference, therefore,
is given by the willingness-to-pay WTP d = −(0.5× (x−1 + x))/15, where x−1 is
the last choice before switching. We set WTP d = 0.667 (WTP d = −0.667) if a
subject chooses the unequal (egalitarian) distribution all along.
Analogously, the second block, the advantageous inequality block, involves
five choices between an egalitarian distribution of 100 points (50 : 50) and an
unequal distribution 50 + y : 35, where y ∈ {−10,−5, 0, 5, 10}. The unequal
distribution decreases efficiency from 5 up to 25 points and involves advantageous
inequality for the decision maker. Own payoff maximization would imply that
the subjects switch to the unequal distribution not before y = 0 (50 : 35). If she
switches before that choice, she is spiteful, willing to sacrifice her own income in
order to minimize the income of the other player. The later she switches, the
6For a detailed description of the price-list technique, we refer to Kerschbamer (2013). The
instructions can be found in the Appendix, specifically in AppendixA.2 and Tables 9 and 10.
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more the compensation she would require to tolerate advantageous inequality.
A measure of inequality aversion, therefore, is given by the willingness-to-pay
WTP a = (0.5 × (y−1 + y))/15, where y−1 is the last choice before switching.
We set WTP a = −0.667 (WTP a = 0.667) if a subject chooses the unequal
(egalitarian) distribution all along.
The two blocks were presented randomly. The subjects received a combined
payoff of one of the ten choices as a decision maker and one of the ten choices as
a passive agent. It was impossible, however, to be matched with the same person
twice.
The third part of the experiment elicited risk attitudes using a standardized
lottery-selection design (see Holt and Laury, 2002, 2005) in the modified version
of Balafoutas et al. (2012), where the subjects have to decide between a lottery
(125, 0.5; 0, 0.5) and a certain payment 12.5 × r, r = 1, . . . , 10. Again, a subject
should switch only once from the risky lottery to the safe payment but never
in the other direction. If a subject switches before r = 5, she is risk-averse
otherwise, she is risk-loving. The risk index is given by R = r/10, where smaller
values reflect more risk aversion and R = 1 if the safe payment is chosen only if
it stochastically dominates the lottery. One decision was randomly chosen and
paid out. After the end of the experiment, we asked the subjects to fill in a
non-incentivized personal questionnaire. We also asked them to state whether
they would evaluate themselves as “risk-neutral,” “risk-averse,” or “risk-loving”
on a five-point scale. The Q-index was encoded as follows: Q = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2,
from risk-avers to risk-loving.
3. Hypotheses
3.1. Status Quo Bias
Status quo bias is a composite hypothesis on differences between voting behav-
iors in Scenario A (majority is better-off with a reform) and Scenario B (majority
is worse-off with a reform). F&R (pp. 1148–1149) derived the status-quo-bias
hypothesis from two subsets of hypotheses, with each subset addressing one sce-
nario. First, they considered the two treatments of reform scenario A, A:EL and
A:CG.
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HA:CG: “In the presence of complete certainty, the reform in question would
. . . be adopted.”
HA:EL2: Former L-players who turn into G-players after the uncertainty has
been resolved would vote for a reform.7 HA:CG then implies that the reform
would be passed.
HA:EL1: In anticipation of HA:EL2, the reform would be rejected right from the
start.8
The first hypothesis regarding the Certain Gain Treatment A:CG is self-evident:
the A-type reform is always adopted by the majority and is never undone in the
second vote. The second hypothesis concerns the second vote of the Expected
Loss Treatment A:EL only. The single L-subject who switches to the G role after
the reform has been adopted in the first vote would act as a G-subject in the
second vote; therefore, an A-type reform that is adopted in the first vote is never
undone in the second vote. The last hypothesis is then obtained by backward
induction. Since L-subjects know that the A-type reform is never undone in the
second vote and expect losses, they do not vote in favor of the reform in the first
vote. HA:EL1 would not emerge if L-subjects were sufficiently risk-loving. Note
that HA:EL2 can only be tested if HA:EL1 is rejected (reforms are adopted in the
first vote).
The next subset of hypotheses is derived from the two treatments of reform
scenario B, a reform that involves a loss to the majority.
HB:CL: “Under certainty . . . the reform would not command majority support.”
HB:EG: “When there is uncertainty, the expected benefit could be positive for
all. [However, ] . . . if there is ever a second vote . . . the reform may be
repealed.”
7In the words of F&R, “The potential winners in the L[oosing]-sector would join W[inning]-
Sector individuals to pass the reform.”
8As stated by F&R on the basis of their model‘s assumptions, “The reform is not adopted
even though (i) individuals are risk-neutral, (ii) a majority would vote for the reform ex-post,
and (iii) both (i) and (ii) are common knowledge.”
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Again, the first hypothesis is self-evident. The L-majority in the Certain Loss
Treatment B:CL would lose from the reform, and therefore, the reform is adopted
in neither the first nor the second vote. The second hypothesis on the Expected
Gain Treatment B:EG may be motivated, for example, by L-subjects’ risk prefer-
ences. If L subjects are only mildly risk-averse and the expected gain is sufficient,
they may vote in favor of the reform in the first vote. However, as three L-players
suffer a certain loss, a once-accepted reform is undone in the second vote by the
L-majority.
Combining these hypotheses would lead to a status quo bias:
HSQB: Reforms that involve an expected loss (A:EL) would be rejected by
the majority repeatedly (HA:EL1); however, when reforms that involve an
expected gain (B:EG) are implemented, they would be quickly repealed
(HB:EG).
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Hence, the hypothesized status quo bias arises from a structural difference be-
tween A- and B-type reforms. Uncertainty is sustained in Reform Scenario A,
but is likely to be resolved in Scenario B. As a consequence, the anti-reform bias
persists in Scenario A, whereas the pro-reform bias is corrected in Scenario B.
Empirically, the hypothesis implies that it is more likely that reforms will not
be implemented in Scenario A, when the decisive voter faces an expected loss
(although a majority would gain from the reform), than in Scenario B, when
this voter gains in expectation (but the majority would lose). In our design,
implementation of a reform in both scenarios increases efficiency by 20%, but
the reform makes more people better off in Scenario A (3/5) than in Scenario B
(2/5). An important implication of HSQB is that opportunities for an efficient
reform are passed over even in cases where a majority of voters is better off after
the reform.
9In the words of F&R, “In the other case (where a reform is not passed) [Treatment A:EL],
no new information is revealed, since the status quo is maintained. This asymmetry between
the two cases leads to a status quo bias.”
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3.2. Social Preferences and Risk Attitudes
As noted above, F&R assume risk neutrality. Here, we briefly discuss what
happens if this assumption is violated. A hypothesis directly affected by risk
attitudes is HA:EL1: L-subjects who are sufficiently risk-loving would vote for
the reform in the A:EL-treatment because they have a chance of turning into
a G-player. One could argue that HB:EG is also affected by risk preferences: if
L-subjects were sufficiently risk-averse, they would vote against the reform de-
spite the expected gain in the first vote. Note, however, that B-reforms would be
revoked anyway in the second vote. Taken together, they have the implication
that risk preferences tend to mitigate the status quo bias because A-type reforms
might be tried out in the first vote and approved again in the second vote (as im-
plied by HEL2). In the results section, we test this conjecture by checking whether
risk attitudes, efficiency preferences, or errors are responsible for accepted A:EL
reforms.10
Regarding social preferences, G-subjects may vote against a reform because
of inequality aversion; that is, they exhibit a positive willingness-to-pay to avoid
advantageous inequality (WTP a > 0). Such a preference would affect HA:CG
and HA:EL2 in Reform Scenario A. If inequality aversion among G-subjects is
widespread, the reform could be rejected despite a majority of subjects standing
to gain in monetary terms. HA:EL1 is not affected because uncertain A-type
reforms are anyway rejected by the L-majority. In Scenario B, G-players who are
sufficiently inequality-averse could vote against B:EG reforms in the first vote. In
terms of the compound hypothesis, these voters would again not matter because
B-reforms would be revoked anyway in the second vote. In summary, inequality
aversion may diminish the status quo bias because fewer B-type reforms would
be tried out in the first vote.
Social preferences may also matter for L-subjects. In particular, they may
opt for a reform in Scenario A because of efficiency preferences (WTP d > 0).
Such voting may be referred to as “sociotropic” because L-subjects support an
efficiency-boosting reform even if it comes at a monetary cost. Sociotropic voting
10Risk attitudes are measured by the Risk-Index R, elicited in Part 3 of the experiment, and
the risk self-assessment Q is elicited in the post-experimental questionnaire.
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of this type would blur the difference between the A:CG and A:EL treatments
because A:EL reforms are more likely to be adopted. Likewise, it would increase
the likelihood of B-type reforms (in both treatments).11 In summary, efficiency
preferences may mitigate the status quo bias because more A- and B-type reforms
would be adopted.
3.3. Accounting for Errors
As formulated above, status quo bias is rejected if the pattern observed in
the data does not turn out exactly as hypothesized. One might argue, however,
that such a strict “normative” test– though exhibiting enormous power– is unfair
because the subjects commit errors. To account for this argument, we allow for
a slight deviation from the pure prediction of the hypothesis. Furthermore, we
have listed two possible behavioral reasons for intended deviations from the pre-
dicted behavior, namely risk attitudes and social preferences. So even if empirical
deviations from status quo bias are consistent with social preferences, in reality,
the subjects could just commit errors.12
We deal with the problem by constructing a plausibility test: As suggested by
Becker (1962, p. 5), “impulsive” and “erratic” irrational behaviors are modeled
probabilistically; that is, we assume there is a small probability ε that an L-
subject could act like a G-player and vice versa. As in the quantal-response-
equilibrium (QRE) solution concept in game theory (see McKelvey and Palfrey,
1992), we use the term “noisy play” to describe this pattern of behavior, which
may lead to outcomes not predicted by the deterministic choice model.13 The
11In the treatments with uncertainty, the matter may be somewhat complicated by fairness
views about risk-taking. In a recent study by Cappelen et al. (2013), most subjects focused
on ex-ante opportunities, yet favored ex-post redistribution. The subjects thereby made a
distinction between ex-post inequalities that reflected differences in luck and ex-post inequalities
that reflected differences in choices. In contrast, in our experiment, efficiency-minded subjects
who vote in favor of a reform take the risk of creating a more unequal ex-post distribution of
payoffs.
12We owe this point to a referee.
13QRE assumes that players choose with a certain probability the wrong pure strategy, that
errors are reduced by learning and that more costly errors are less likely. In the extreme
case where players are completely irrational, all strategies become equally likely. The respec-
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keynote of our approach is to treat each group voting result as the outcome of a
sequence of five identical independent Bernoulli trials with unknown probability
ε of committing an error, and to ask whether the difference between the predicted
and observed voting outcomes can be “explained” by a plausible error rate.14 This
setup is used in two interrelated ways in order to test noisy play. First, we fix error
rates ε of 1%, 5%, and 10%, and compute the exact number of unpredicted reform
outcomes n˜ε that would be compatible with the respective error rate. Second,
we use the number of unexpectedly accepted reforms in order to compute the
exact error rate εˆn that would be compatible with n. So, if either n > n˜ε or
εˆn > ε, we say that we “reject” noisy play, because the number of unexpected
voting outcomes and its corresponding error rate are implausibly high. Note
that the above described plausibility test is normative in the sense that it does
not involve stochastic assumptions concerning n.15 Apart from the plausibility
test, we directly assess in the experiment the subjects’ social preferences and risk
attitudes using the procedures explained above and check, whether the results can
alternatively be explained by individual social preferences and/or risk attitudes.
4. Results
The experiment was conducted in 16 sessions in 2013 at the experimental
laboratory of the University of Bremen. There were 80 subjects participating
tive rationality parameter is estimated from experimental data assuming a specific probability
distribution of the players’ responses (usually a logistic distribution).
14Given our experimental design, the probability that a reform is adopted when there
are x L-players and y G-players is given by p :=
∑x
r=0
∑y
s=0
(
x
r
)(
y
s
)
εy+r−s(1 −
ε)x−r+sI{r+s≥(x+y)/2}, where I = 1 if the condition stated in parentheses (majority vote)
is fulfilled and I = 0, otherwise. Let t denote the total number of group votes (i.e., the sample
size) and n the number of accepted reforms. Setting x > y, pˆ = n/t denotes the point estimate
of the probability p that a reform is unexpectedly adopted. Plugging pˆ into the formula and
solving for ε gives a point estimate εˆ for the error rate.
15Treating each group outcome itself as an independent Bernoulli trial, n becomes a random
variable and the confidence intervals for n can be computed using the binomial distribution
(e.g., Mood et al., 1974, p. 393). Since these confidence intervals are sizeable for a low sample
size (t = 16), we abstain from reporting them here.
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in each treatment, 320 subjects in total. Most subjects were undergraduate
economics students. Upon arrival at the laboratory, the subjects were randomly
placed at the computers. They received written instructions.16 One session lasted
for 60 min and an average subject earned e17.50. All decisions and payoffs were
made in private. Section 4.1 presents the group results of testing the hypotheses
stated in Section 3.1. Section 4.2 presents the individual results and aims at
explaining deviations from the predicted status quo bias by social preferences,
risk preferences (Section 3.2), and noisy play (Section 3.3).
4.1. Group Outcomes
To give a first picture of the data, Figure 1 displays group outcomes and
individual voting by treatment and vote. By looking at the two leftmost bars
for Reform Scenario A, one immediately sees that acceptance rates are far from
the predicted 0% under uncertainty (see A:EL). This holds true for both the
first and second votes. Consequently, we see little support for the hypothesis
that uncertainty would cause a bias against reform in this case (compare second-
vote outcomes between A:EL and A:CG). Regarding Reform Scenario B, the
initially somewhat-popular reform meets with less support after uncertainty has
been resolved (see first vs. second vote in B:EG). While this pattern is consistent
with hypothesis HB:EG, the observed approval rates are too high compared to 0%,
which is the prediction in absence of uncertainty (see B:CL). Overall, we see little
empirical support for a status quo bias: the second-vote differences in outcomes
between A:EL and A:CG should be negative and significantly smaller than those
between B:EG and B:CL. In fact, not much of a difference exists between those
cases.
Insert Figure 1 here.
We now provide a formal analysis of the results. Table 3 summarizes the
group-level outcomes of the experiment by treatment and vote. The variable n is
the total number of accepted reforms and p is the share of accepted reforms. We
use εˆn to denote the error rate compatible with n. For the second vote, we report
16For a transcript of the instructions, see AppendixA.
16
n, p, and – in relevant cases – with εˆn also being provided for reforms that were
adopted and not adopted, respectively, in the first vote. We denote the number
of accepted reforms (in the individual analysis: yes votes) in vote i of treatment
j by nij. We leave the treatment index out if not required.
Insert Table 3 here.
We begin the analysis by testing HA:CG for the Certain Gain Treatment. In
contrast to the hypothesis, which holds that all reforms should pass (nˆ1A:CG =
nˆ2A:CG
!
= 16), the actual number of accepted reforms is distinctly lower (n1, n2 =
12). Note that the group outcomes are consistent across votes, i.e., no accepted
reform was undone and no rejected reform was accepted in the second vote. We
reject the hypothesis that these relatively low acceptance rates are explained by
noisy play, since the error rate would have to be implausibly high (11.6%) in order
to explain the observed outcome. As can be understood from the table notes,
allowing for an error rate of ε = 10% would imply n˜.10 = 3.6 rejected reforms at
maximum, which is less than the 16−12 = 4 actually observed rejections. Hence,
HA:CG is rejected both in a strict normative sense and if allowing for noisy play.
HA:EL2 concerns the second vote of the expected loss treatment. Here, reforms
passing the first vote do not get revoked in the second vote because of L-players
switching to the G-role. In fact, there are n1 = 10 groups opting in favor of
the reform in the first vote and only n2 = 8 in the second, that is, 20% of all
accepted reforms were actually revoked.17 Hence, HA:EL2 is rejected in a strict
sense, but the deviation from the prediction could be explained by noisy play
with a relatively high error rate.
Next, we turn to HA:EL1. This hypothesis purports that L-players anticipate
that once-accepted reforms will not be undone in the second vote, and therefore,
the majority of L-players blocks the reform in the first vote. However, Table 3
shows a surprising result: n1 = 10 reforms are accepted in the first vote, while
nˆ1A:EL1
!
= 0 was expected. The error rate would have to reach an incredible 76.4%,
meaning that it is more likely that an L-player votes in favor of the reform instead
17The error rate would have to be 8.6% in order to explain this result. For fixed error rates
of 5% and 10%, we get at most n˜.05 = 1.3 and n˜.10 = 2.2 rejected reforms.
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of voting against it.18
Comparing the first vote of A:EL and its control treatment A:CG by means
of a χ2-test cannot reject the null hypothesis of identical group outcomes (χ2 =
0.582, p = .446). Apparently, the subjects did not show a lower support for the
reform under uncertainty. Altogether, these results do not support the first part
of the status-quo-bias hypothesis.
Turning to B-type reforms, we see that in the Certain Loss Treatment (B :
CL) n1 = 4 reforms are accepted in the first vote and n2 = 3 in the second.
Furthermore, among the four reform proposals accepted in the first vote, three are
later revoked. In the second vote, two groups adopt the reform despite rejecting
it in the first vote. According to HB:CL, we should not observe any reform being
accepted, nˆi
!
= 0, i = 1, 2, because the L-players who lose are in majority. The
error rate would have to be ε = 11.6% (7.9%) in order to explain the first (second)
voting outcome by noisy play. Only n˜.10 = 3.6 (n˜.05 = 2.1) accepted reforms are
plausible, which is less than the observed four (three) accepted reforms. Hence,
noisy play does not explain the group outcomes of this treatment.
Hypothesis HB:EG implies that if a reform is accepted in the first vote, it will
be repealed by the L-majority in the second vote. There could, however, be any
number n1 ∈ [0, 16] of accepted reforms in the first vote. We actually observe
n1 = 8. Seven of these reforms are repealed in the second vote (87.5%). It is
likely that the final acceptance of the single remaining reform is by chance, since
we obtain εˆ = 4.8%. Hence, the data do not reject HB:EG.
Altogether, with regard to the second subset of the hypotheses targeting Sce-
nario B, the results are less negative. HB:EG could not be rejected, whereas in the
control treatment B:CL, too many reforms were somehow accepted such that the
results could still be attributed to noisy play. We would expect more accepted
reforms in the first vote of the Expected Gain Treatment than in the Certain Loss
Treatment, where the prediction was zero. A χ2 test does not reject; however,
the equality of voting behavior between those cases (8 vs. 4 accepted reforms in
the first vote, χ2 = 2.133, p = 0.144). In the second vote, we should expect all
18The plausibility test predicts at maximum n˜.10 = 3.6  10 unintentionally accepted re-
forms.
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reforms to be rejected in both treatments. The equality of both treatments can-
not be rejected (three vs. two accepted reforms, χ2 = 0.237, p = 0.626), but our
previous tests have shown that the number of accepted reforms is significantly
higher than zero.
Finally, the status-quo-bias hypothesis (HSQB) predicts an asymmetric effect
of uncertainty of the form that the difference between nˆ1B:EG and nˆ
1
A:EL(= 0) is
positive and larger than that between nˆ2B:EG and nˆ
2
A:EL(= 0) (the latter difference
is predicted to be zero). We have already shown that the number of accepted
reforms is by far too large in the A:EL treatment and relatively close to zero in the
second vote of the B:EG treatment. Hence, a formal test is almost superfluous.
Indeed, a χ2-test does not reject the null of independence of the two treatments
(χ2 = 0.508, p = 0.476) in the first vote, but strongly rejects it in the second
(χ2 = 5.236, p = 0.022).
To summarize this section, we do not find evidence of status quo bias at the
group level. The subjects performed almost exactly as predicted in the Expected
Gain Treatment of Scenario B, but too many reforms passed the first vote of the
Expected Loss Treatment of Scenario A (and then were not revoked as correctly
predicted by HA:EL). We have also seen that the most prominent deviations from
the predicted outcomes are not explained by noisy play. In the next subsection,
we therefore analyze individual voting behavior and look for correlations with
social preferences and risk attitudes.
4.2. Individual Outcomes
As a prerequisite for the individual-level analysis, we checked the homogeneity
of our sample across treatments with respect to WTP d, WTP a, R, Q, gender,
and subject of study. The results of this exercise have been relegated to Table 11
in AppendixB for interested readers.19
19About 30% of our subjects were economics students; 47.5% males; the average risk self-
assessment was risk neutrality, Q = −0.028; the average risk index was close to risk neutrality
too (R = 0.517). Furthermore, the subjects were almost neutral toward disadvantageous in-
equality, WTP d = 0.039, and were slightly inequality averse, WTP a = 0.228. Female non-econ
subjects were slightly (yet not significantly) over-represented in the B:EG treatment, which
caused a significant drop in the R measure there (higher risk aversion). However, this deviation
19
G-subjects
We first focus on the voting behavior of original G-subjects, shown in Table
4. This analysis does not include L-subjects who turned into G-subjects after
adopting a reform in A:EL or B:EG. Original G-subjects should not be affected
by risk attitudes in their voting behavior since their roles are fixed. Apart from
noisy play, the only reason whyG-players might vote against a reform is inequality
aversion. In fact, we see that most G-players vote for the reform in all treatments
and both votes. Note that the share of G-subjects voting against the reform in
B:EG seems to be slightly different (too high) in the first vote, but all players
correct their decisions in the predicted direction in the second vote. If we allow
for individual error rates of up to 10%, almost every vote be attributed to noisy
play.
Insert Table 4 here.
Part of the behavior that appears consistent with the individual error rate is
perhaps driven by some unobserved social preferences. In the following section,
we will check whether inequality aversion can add an explanatory dimension to
the observed pattern of G-subjects’ voting behavior. Table 5 displays the results
of running logit regressions on G-subjects’ vote (yes = 1/no = 0) in the first vote
as the dependent variable.
Insert Table 5 here.
Regression (G1) shows that there is no treatment effect for G-players. The
benchmark treatment is the Certain Loss Treatment of the B Scenario, where
the majority loses following the reform (B:CL). Neither adding uncertainty
(yes(A:EL,B:EG)= 1/no(A:CG,B:CL)= 0) nor making the majority better-off
following the reform (yes(A:EL,A:CG)= 1/no(B : EG,B : CL)= 0), nor com-
bining both (yes(A:EL)= 1/no(other)= 0), has an impact on voting decisions.
Regression (G2) verifies a strong negative correlation of the willingness-to-pay
measure for avoiding advantageous inequality WTP a with the vote variable. This
outcome confirms our conjecture that inequality aversion prevents the subjects
is irrelevant for any of our hypotheses and for hypothesis HB:EG, in particular.
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from approving reforms that are in their own favor. Regression (G3) shows that
this effect remains stable if we add treatment dummies. Regression (G4) checks
whether differential slopes of WTP a exist with respect to treatment variables;
that is, if the impact of inequality aversion on voting decisions differs for differ-
ent treatments. This was not found to be the case. However, WTP a becomes
insignificant in this regression and WTP a × A:EL exhibits a positive coefficient
of the same size. This indicates that inequality aversion is least influential in the
Expected Loss Treatment, where the majority wins following the reform and a
“renegade” L-subject is required to enforce the reform. Regression (G5) checks
for the impact of further variables on the voting decision.20,21
L-subjects
When studying L-subjects’ behavior, we have to carefully account for the
possibility of a subjects undergoing a role change between the first and second
votes. In the second vote, the subjects may still have been L-players because
the reform was rejected or because they did not turn into a G-player; some other
L-subjects turned into G-players when the reform had been accepted in the first
vote. Table 6 shows the voting behavior of L-subjects in the first vote. The Table
shows the presence of strong treatment effects: L-subjects approved the reform at
most in the Expected Gain Treatment (48.4%), closely followed by the Expected
Loss Treatment (33.3%). In the two control treatments A:CG and B:CL, where
L-subjects would lose with certainty, approval rates dropped to 6.3% and 10.4%,
respectively. It is, therefore, not surprising that we can explain voting behavior
in these two treatments by noisy play quite well (εˆn ≤ 5% and 10%, respectively).
Insert Table 6 here.
20We also tested the significance of the interactions among these variables with the treatment
dummies. Since none were significant, the respective output is omitted.
21Running the same logit regression analysis for the second vote is impossible for technical
reasons, since we would have to distinguish between four groups of G-subjects (voted yes/no
in approved/disapproved reform) and there are only 11 no votes. Running a pooled regression
with all four distinct groups of G-subjects yields almost exactly the same significant WPT a
coefficient of about −5 as for the first voting.
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Table 7 reports the results of logit-regressions to shed light on the determi-
nants of L-subjects’ voting behavior (yes = 1/no = 0) in the first vote as the
dependent variable. The regression displayed in column (L1) tests for the effect
of uncertainty. The positive coefficient signals that uncertainty significantly in-
creased the likelihood of the subjects voting yes. There are no treatment effects
with respect to the scenario; that is, whether or not the majority was better-off
following a reform did not influence L-subjects’ voting decisions. Regression (L2)
shows a significant positive impact of WTP d (measured efficiency preference) on
the voting outcomes: the subjects with a lower demand for compensation for dis-
advantageous inequality, and thus a higher WTP d, show higher support for the
reform. Regression (L3) shows that these results remain stable when we jointly
include all variables in the regression. Regression (L4) denies the hypothesis that
different slopes (different effects of WTP d across treatments) exist.
Insert Table 7 here.
In regression (L5), we enter R, WTP a, and Pivotal as further explanatory
variables into the regression. Quite surprisingly, R turned out to be insignificant
in this and all further regressions we performed. Exchanging R for the risk-self-
assessment Q or gender did not change the results. In other words, risk attitudes
did not seem to influence the subjects’ voting behavior in any of the treatments
or roles. Since the subjects, on average, were risk-neutral according to the R
and Q measures, this observation underpins the assumption of risk neutrality by
F&R.
Regarding variable Pivotal, the results show that L-subjects voted yes signif-
icantly less often when they believed their vote was pivotal. At the same time,
the coefficient of WTP d increased distinctly. In line with Feddersen et al. (2009)
and Shayo and Harel (2012), this result suggests that people are more likely to
exhibit social preferences in voting when they expect that their decision comes
at a low cost to themselves.
Finally, regression (L5) reveals a negative impact of inequality aversion WTP a
on the likelihood of a yes vote. While such an effect may be plausible for reform
gainers, it seems surprising for L-subjects. In regression (L6), we replaced the
uncertainty dummy by an interaction between uncertainty and WTP a. Here, we
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see an even stronger effect of WTP a: inequality-averse L-subjects are generally
more likely to vote against a reform. However, the significant positive interaction
terms of almost the same size mean that inequality considerations were relevant
only if there was no prospect of becoming a winner. In the end, it seems, that
social preferences are still egocentric and do not convey the ethically reflected
value judgments of an impartial observer (see Traub et al. 2009).
Putting these results into perspective regarding our hypotheses, we have seen
that HA:EL1 was rejected because too many reforms were passed. Now, we see
that L-subjects tend to approve reforms because they value efficiency. In the
treatments not involving uncertainty (A:CG and B:CL), we also observe a certain
reluctance to pass reforms due to (anticipatory) inequality aversion. This explains
the pattern of yes/no votes displayed in Table 6.
4.3. Discussion
Table 8 summarizes our insights regarding the formal hypotheses outlined in
Section 3.1. The second column (“Group Outcome”) contains the results from
Subsection 4.1 concerning the various sub-hypotheses underlying the status-quo-
bias hypothesis stated in the first column. Subsection 4.2 shows that the subjects’
voting behavior was influenced by inequality aversion (G-subjects) and efficiency
preferences (L-subjects), apart from errors. Besides what we have already estab-
lished, the results of column three (“Individual Outcome”) of Table 8 are derived
by analyzing the way individual voting behaviors affected group outcomes, that
is, whether social preferences not only affected individual behavior but also voting
outcomes, and therefore can be held responsible for the rejection of the various
sub-hypotheses of the status-quo-bias hypothesis. This final step requires a de-
tailed analysis of each group outcome with respect to the voting behavior of all
different subject types. In order to save on space, we have moved the details of
this analysis to AppendixC and provided a summary conclusion below.
Insert Table 8 here.
The upshot of our analysis is that social preferences and/or noisy play can
consistently explain the absence of status quo bias. In Scenario A, we observe
inequality aversion in G-subjects and in L→ G-subjects (i.e., L-players who join
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the subgroup of G-players after the reform), which leads them to reject reforms in
the first round or revoke accepted reforms in the second round. L-subjects exhibit
efficiency preferences, bringing them to accept disadvantageous reforms. Hence,
instead of observing no reform at all, we observe too many accepted reforms to be
explained by noisy play alone.22 To be precise, we observe 13 (10.2%) G-subjects
voting in line with being inequality averse,23 but 54 (28.1%) L-subjects voting in
line with having efficiency preferences (Table 6). Limiting the admissible error
rate to 10%, Tables 4 and 6 also clearly show that the large number of L-subjects’
yes votes cannot be explained by noisy play: the computed error rate exceeds 10%
(εˆ = 26.6%) and we would expect n˜.10 = 24 54 yes votes at most. In contrast,
G-subjects’ no votes could alternatively be explained by error (εˆ = 7.5% < 10%
and n˜.10 = 17 > 13).
With regard to the main hypothesis HSQB, we conclude that we do not observe
n1B:EG > n
1
A:EL = 0 but 8 ≈ 10  0, due to efficiency preferences in L-subjects
and noisy play (see HA:EL1), as well as n
1
A:EL = n
2
B:EG = 0 but 8 > 2 ≈ 0, due to
efficiency preferences in L-subjects, noisy play, and the high acceptance rate of
A:EL reforms in the first vote.
5. Conclusion
We experimentally studied the role of social preferences in voting on efficiency-
enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms. Transferring a thought experiment
by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) to the experimental laboratory, we combined
two different reform scenarios (majority is better-off vs. majority is worse-off
with reform) with two different risk scenarios (uncertainty about distribution of
gains and losses vs. certainty) in order to conduct four treatments, where groups
of subjects had to vote in a two-step procedure on efficiency-enhancing reform
proposals involving gains for some group members and losses for others. In two
additional tasks, we elicited the subjects’ social preferences (see Kerschbamer,
22In Scenario B, the picture is less clear concerning the impact of efficiency preferences in
L-subjects upon votes, but individual errors can well explain the rejection of hypotheses HB:CL
and HB:EG.
23See the bottom row of Table 4, where 115 (89.8%) of 128 G-subjects voted yes.
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2013) and risk attitudes (see Holt and Laury, 2002, 2005). F&R hold that uncer-
tainty about the distribution of gains and losses from a reform leads to a political
status quo bias: reforms that make a majority worse-off following a reform, but
involve an expected gain for the majority from an ex-ante perspective, are more
likely to be accepted than those that make a majority better-off, but involve an
expected loss for the majority from an ex-ante perspective. We hypothesized that
sociotropic voting in reform losers helps to overcome anti-reform bias.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: We observed that (i) effi-
ciency preferences in reform losers lead them to support reforms that are to their
own disadvantage (logit-regression analysis reported in Table 7); (ii) inequality
aversion in reform gainers leads them to decline reforms that are to their own
advantage (logit-regression analysis reported in Table 5); (iii) “noisy play” (e.g.,
McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992) can explain some of the unpredicted observations
(see the error estimates in Tables 3, 4, and 6 as well as the Summary Table 8);
(iv) the subjects were, on average, risk-neutral, and voting decisions were not
affected by risk preferences even in reform setups involving uncertainty– which
underpins F&R’s presumption of risk-neutrality (Tables 5 and 7); (v) if reform
losers believed that their votes were pivotal, they were more likely to reject dis-
advantageous reforms (Table 7); (vi) status quo bias could not be evidenced at
the group level (Table 3), but we could explain deviations from the predicted vot-
ing behavior, expressed by a series of six hypotheses, by either social preferences
and/or by noisy play (Table 8).
One may argue that the parameters of our experiments have favored this
outcome because deviations from self-interest were less costly for reform losers
than gainers. This difference in the cost of sociotropic voting may explain why we
observe, in both absolute and relative terms, more sociotropic than inequality-
averse voting (remember that we observed 13 (10.2%) G-subjects demonstrating
inequality-averse voting, but 54 (28.1%) L-subjects voting in line with efficiency
preferences; see Tables 4 and 6, first votes). Such differences may also explain why
some studies find social-welfare preferences to be quantitatively more important
than difference aversion (e.g, Ackert et al., 2004; Messer et al., 2010; Engelmann
and Strobel, 2004), whereas others find the reverse (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels,
2006; Sauermann and Kaiser, 2010; Ho¨chtl et al., 2012). In F&R’s thought
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experiment as well as in our empirical experiment, losses were distributed evenly
among reform losers, while gains were evenly distributed among reform gainers.
Since reform losers were in majority, individual losses had to undercut individual
gains for “accounting” reasons. We would like to leave it for future research to find
out, whether our results with respect to the prevalence of efficiency preferences
can be generalized, like an asymmetric intragroup allocation of losses.
Note that the role of social preferences is likely to increase when the number
of voters increases, as compared to our study, where voting took place in small
five-player committees. Result (v) showed that the subjects were less likely to
vote in a sociotropic manner if they believed themselves to be casting a pivotal
vote; if anything, voters are more likely to be pivotal in small elections. We may
see even more of a “moral bias” when the electorate is large (see Feddersen et al.,
2009; Shayo and Harel, 2012). Moreover, if we inflate the size of the electorate
and assume that the fraction of voters who deviate from self-interest (or make
errors) remains unaffected by this change, our results imply that a reform would
be passed up to the point where reform losers outnumber gainers by a factor of
1.82.24 In other words, if we had 1000 voters who stood to gain from the reform,
the point estimates obtained from our experiment suggest that the proposal would
be passed with votes from up to 1820 voters who would lose from the reform.
Democratic institutions have to debate on efficiency-enhancing but inequality-
increasing reforms on a day-to-day basis. We have shown that political status
quo bias arising from uncertainty is mitigated by social preferences: many reform
losers vote for reform because they value efficiency. This effect is stronger than
the opposite bias, where potential gainers vote against reform in opposition to
increased inequality. This result might be seen as good news for the efficiency of
democratic institutions.
24With a simple majority, the reform would pass whenever (# of losers)(# of gainers) ≥ 1−2γ1−2δ , where γ is
the share of reform gainers who vote against the reform because of inequality aversion, and δ
is the share of reform losers who vote in favor of the reform because of efficiency preferences.
In the experiment, we observed γ = 0.102 and δ = 0.281 (see Tables 4 and 6, first votes), such
that 1−2γ1−2δ = 1.82.
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Tables
Table 1: Treatment Structure
Risk Setting
Reform Scenario Uncertain Certain
Majority is better-off Expected Certain
with the reform Loss Gain
(Scenario A) A:EL A:CG
(#obs = 80) (#obs = 80)
Majority is worse-off Expected Certain
with the reform Gain Loss
(Scenario B) B:EG B:CL
(#obs = 80) (#obs = 80)
Table notes. Number of subjects per treatment (#obs)
in parentheses. 5 subjects per group. 16 groups per
treatment. 4 sessions with four groups per treatment.
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Table 2: Implementation of Treatments
Treatment Income Group Composition
all Pre-Reform 240 240 240 240 240
Exp. Loss Role L L La G G
(A:EL) Post-Reform 171 171 366 366 366
Exp. Gain/Loss −4 −4 −4 +126 +126
Certain Gain Role L L G G G
(A:CG) Post-Reform 171 171 366 366 366
Gain/Loss −69 −69 +126 +126 +126
Exp. Gain Role L L L La G
(B:EG) Post-Reform 171 171 171 464 464
Exp. Gain/Loss +4.25 +4.25 +4.25 +4.25 +224
Certain Loss Role L L L G G
(B:CL) Post-Reform 171 171 171 464 464
Gain/Loss −69 −69 −69 +224 +224
Table notes. a A previously unknown L-player turns into a G player
after the reform.
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Table 3: Group Outcomes
Accepted Reforms
1st Vote 2nd Vote, all 2nd Vote, 1st Yes 2nd Vote, 1st No
Treat. n p% εˆ% n p% εˆ% n p% εˆ% n p% εˆ%
A:EL 10 62.5 76.4 8 50.0 — 8 80.0 8.6 0 0.0 —
A:CG 12 75.0 11.6 12 75.0 11.6 12 100.0 11.6 0 0.0 —
B:EG 8 50.0 — 2 12.5 — 1 12.5 4.8 1 12.5 —
B:CL 4 25.0 11.6 3 18.8 7.9 1 25.0 — 2 16.7 —
Table notes. n =number of accepted reforms. p = n/16 share of accepted reforms.
εˆ =computed error rate. HA:CG: outcomes for ε = 1%, 5%, 10%: n˜ε = 0.5, 2.1, 3.6
rejected reforms. Observed: 4/16. HA:EL2: n˜ε = 0.3, 1.3, 2.2 not repealed reforms.
Observed: 2/10. HA:EL1: n˜ε = 0.5, 2.1, 3.6 accepted reforms. Observed: 10/16. HB:CL:
n˜ε = 0.5, 2.1, 3.6 accepted reforms. Observed: 4/16 (vote 1), 3/16 (vote 2). HB:EG:
n˜ε = 0.2, 1.0, 1.8 not repealed reforms. Observed: 1/8. Dashes mean no test per-
formed/nonapplicable.
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Table 4: G-Subjects’ Voting Behavior
Yes Votes
1st Vote 2nd Vote, all 2nd Vote, 1st Yes 2nd Vote, 1st No
Treat. n p% εˆ% n p% εˆ% n p % εˆ% n p % εˆ%
A:EL 30 93.8 2.8 30 93.8 2.8 30 100.0 0.0 0 0.0 —
A:CG 44 91.7 4.9 43 89.6 6.8 43 97.9 0.5 0 0.0 —
B:EG 12 75.0 21.5 16 100.0 0.0 12 100.0 0.0 4 100.0 0.0
B:CL 29 90.6 5.4 28 87.5 8.4 26 89.7 8.1 2 66.7 38.5
All 115 89.8 7.5 117 91.4 6.0 111 96.5 1.6 6 46.2 9.7
Table notes. n =number of yes-votes. p =acceptance rate among G-Subjects. εˆ =computed
error rate. Dashes mean εˆ not computed/nonapplicable. 16 groups per treatment with 2
(A:EL), 3 (A:CG), 1 (B:EG), 2 (B:CL) original G-players.
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Table 5: G-Subjects’ 1st Votes: Logit Regression
Variable (G1) (G2) (G3) (G4) (G5)
Uncertainty -1.170 — -0.049 — -0.004
(0.796) (0.800) (0.810)
Majority 0.129 — 0.842 — 0.843
better-off (0.745) (0.819) (0.806)
A:EL 1.480 — 0.378 — 0.356
(1.047) (1.062) (1.047)
WTP a — -5.012** -5.048** -4.140 -5.129**
(2.363) (2.128) (3.145) (2.140)
WTP a × — —- — -2.061 —
Uncertainty (1.963)
WTP a × — —- — -0.672 —
Majority better-off (2.033)
WTP a × — —- — 4.102 —
A:EL (3.007)
WTP d — — — — 0.252
(0.722)
R — — — — -0.283
(3.421)
Pivotal — — — — 0.172
(0.594)
constant 2.269*** 3.995*** 3.455*** 3.843*** 3.561**
(0.630) (1.262) (1.324) (1.218) (1.835)
Wald-χ2 6.08 4.50** 13.51*** 22.28*** 28.92***
p(χ2) 0.108 0.034 0.009 0.002 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.204 0.233 0.243 0.234
Table notes. #obs = 128 in all regressions. Independent variable: vote
(yes = 1/no = 0). 115 (13) yes (no) votes. *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05,
***p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Session clustered standard
errors.
.
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Table 6: L-Subjects’ Voting Behavior in the 1st Vote
Yes Votes
Treat. n p% εˆ%
A:EL 16 33.3 31.6
A:CG 2 6.3 2.9
B:EG 31 48.4 49.0
B:CL 5 10.4 6.8
All 54 28.1 26.6
Table notes. n =number of yes-votes.
p =acceptance rate among L-Subjects.
εˆ =computed error rate. 16 groups per
treatment with 3 (A:EL), 2 (A:CG), 4
(B:EG), 3 (B:CL) L-players.
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Table 7: L-Subjects’ 1st Votes: Logit Regression
Variable (L1) (L2) (L3) (L4) (L5) (L6)
Uncertainty 2.089*** — 2.104*** — 2.147*** —
(0.331) (0.344) (0.490)
Majority -0.556 — -0.554 — -0.822 -2.169***
better-off (0.586) (0.597) (0.632) (0.691)
A:EL -0.074 — -0.118 — 0.226 2.072***
(0.763) (0.787) (0.779) (0.622)
WTP d — 1.182* 1.176* 0.499 1.654** 1.722**
(0.607) (0.657) (0.803) (0.714) (0.796)
WTP d × — —- — -1.118 — —
Uncertainty (1.293)
WTP d × — —- — 1.842 — —
Majority b.o. (1.178)
WTP d × — —- — -0.319 — —
A:EL (1.645)
WTP a — — — — -1.659*** -3.127***
(0.610) (0.658)
R — — — — 0.122 -0.379
(1.572) (1.411)
Pivotal — — — — -0.885*** -1.036***
(0.224) (0.352)
WTP a × — — — — — 2.493***
Uncertainty (0.631)
constant -2.152*** -0.994*** -2.204*** -0.992*** -1.774** -0.107
(0.200) (0.271) (0.231) (0.282) (0.942) (0.893)
Wald-χ2 48.35*** 3.79* 49.73*** 4.21 45.99*** 48.87***
p(χ2) 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.017 0.153 0.028 0.200 0.141
Table notes. #obs = 192 in all regressions. Independent variable: vote
(yes = 1/no = 0). 54 (138) yes (no) votes. *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05,
***p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Session clustered standard
errors.
.
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Table 8: Summary of Hypotheses and Test Results
Group Outcome Individual Outcome
strict distr. preference
Hypothesis (noisy play) (noisy play)
HA:CG rejected inequality aversion in G
nˆ1A:CG = nˆ
2
A:CG
!
= 16 (rejected) (ε ≤ 10%)
HA:EL2 rejected inequality aversion in L→ G
nˆ2A:EL
!
= n1A:EL (ε ≤ 10%) (rejected)
HA:EL1 rejected efficiency preference in L and
noisy play
nˆ1A:EL
!
= 0 (rejected) (ε =?)
HB:CL rejected —
nˆ1B:CL = nˆ
2
B:CL
!
= 0 (rej./ε ≤ 10%) (ε ≤ 10%)
HB:EG rejected efficiency preferences in L
nˆ2B:EG|1st yes != 0 (ε ≤ 5%) (ε ≤ 10%)
HSQB
nˆ1B:EG
!
> nˆ1A:EL = 0 ∨ rejected efficiency preference in L
— and noisy play
nˆ2B:EG
!
= nˆ2A:EL = 0 rejected efficiency preference in L,
— noisy play, and n1A:EL 
0 (treatment effect of uncer-
tainty)
Table notes. nˆij is the predicted number of accepted reforms in vote i of
treatment j. strict means normative test. noisy play (in parentheses) gives
upper threshold for estimated individual error rate (rejected means > 0.1).
distr. preference explains rejection of H. Dashes mean test nonapplicable.
39
Table 9: Choices in the Distributional-Preferences Elicitation Task: Disadvantageous Inequality
Block
LEFT Your Choice RIGHT
you passive agent you passive agent
get gets get gets
40 Points 65 Points LEFT © © RIGHT 50 Points 50 Points
45 Points 65 Points LEFT © © RIGHT 50 Points 50 Points
50 Points 65 Points LEFT © © RIGHT 50 Points 50 Points
55 Points 65 Points LEFT © © RIGHT 50 Points 50 Points
60 Points 65 Points LEFT © © RIGHT 50 Points 50 Points
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Table 10: Choices in the Distributional-Preferences Elicitation Task: Advantageous Inequality
Block
LEFT Your Choice RIGHT
you passive agent you passive agent
get gets get gets
40 Points 35 Points LEFT © © RIGHT 50 Points 50 Points
45 Points 35 Points LEFT © © RIGHT 50 Points 50 Points
50 Points 35 Points LEFT © © RIGHT 50 Points 50 Points
55 Points 35 Points LEFT © © RIGHT 50 Points 50 Points
60 Points 35 Points LEFT © © RIGHT 50 Points 50 Points
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Table 11: Homogeneity Tests
Treat. WTP d WTP a R Q Gender Econ
A:EL 0.058 0.277 0.520 -0.025 48.8 33.8
(0.299) (0.256) (0.127) (0.842) (50.3) (47.6)
A:CG 0.019 0.202 0.531 0.038 56.3 31.2
(0.288) (0.321) (0.115) (0.754) (49.9) (46.6)
B:EG 0.042 0.265 0.483 -0.200 40.0 21.2
(0.261) (0.313) (0.145) (0.818) (49.3) (41.2)
B:CL 0.037) 0.167 0.534 0.075 45.0 32.5
(0.260) (0.300) (0.120) (0.808) (50.1) (47.1)
All 0.039 0.228 0.517 -0.028 47.5 29.7
(0.276) (0.301) (0.128) (0.809) (50.0) (45.8)
F -test
F 0.27 2.45* 2.77** 1.83 1.51 1.25
p(F ) 0.843 0.064 0.042 0.142 0.213 0.291
Kruskal-Wallis-test
χ2 1.203 6.135 7.586* 4.769 3.364 2.346
p(χ2) 0.752 0.105 0.055 0.190 0.339 0.504
Table notes. #obs = 80 in each treatment. Standard devia-
tions in parentheses. WTP d = (WTP a =) willingness-to-pay
to avoid (dis)advantageous inequality [−0.667, 0.667]. R risk-
index [0.1, 1]. Q risk self-assessment [−2, 2]. Gender: share of
male subjects in percent. Econ: share of economics students
in percent. F -test: null hypothesis of equal means. Kruskal-
Wallis-test: null hypothesis of equal populations.
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Figures
Figure 1: Share of approved reforms (left figure) and yes votes (right figure) by treatment and
vote.
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Figure 2: Decision screen of the 1st vote on the reform
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Figure 3: Decision screen of the 2nd vote on (withdrawing) the reform
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Figure 4: Decision screen of risk-preference elicitation task
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AppendixA. Instructions
AppendixA.1. General Instructions
Welcome to the experiment. In this experiment, you can earn money, provided
that you read these instructions carefully and follow the rules. The money will be
paid out to you in cash immediately after the experiment. During the experiment,
we will use the term “points” instead of Euros. Points will be converted into Euros
as follows: 100 points = 4 Euros. During the experiment, you must not talk to
other participants. If you have a question, please ask us. We will answer your
questions individually. Compliance with these rules is important; otherwise, the
results of the experiment will be of no scientific use.25
The experiment consists of three parts. Each part will be explained separately.
In each part, you can earn money. All together, the experiment will last for
approximately 60 min.
AppendixA.2. Instructions, Part 1
In the 1st part, we will ask you to make 10 decisions. In each decision, you are
assigned to a group with another participant, who is called “passive agent.” Your
decision as an “active decision maker” and the decision of the passive agent are
made anonymously. In each of the 10 decisions, the passive agent is a different
randomly chosen participant. In all decisions, you always have to choose between
a left and a right option. The options are payoff distributions, meaning that both
options are associated with a payoff for you and for the passive agent.
Insert Table 9 here.
Insert Table 10 here.
We ask you to decide for each of the 10 decisions between the left and right
options. The 10 decisions will be presented in two blocks of 5 decisions each.
Please compare row by row the left and right options and decide on your preferred
25Original instructions were in German. Example for the Uncertain Loss Treatment. In-
structions for the other treatments are available on request.
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distribution for each row. You can make your decision by clicking on the left or
right button.
Calculation of your payoff in Part 1. Your payoff from Part 1 results from two
partial payoffs. The 1st partial payoff results from the situation in which you were
the active decision maker. At the end of the 1st Part, the program will randomly
select 1 of the 10 decisions. For this decision situation, your decision between left
and right will determine the payoff for yourself and the passive agent.
The 2nd partial payoff results from the situation in which you were the passive
agent. Following the same procedure as mentioned above, another participant is
randomly selected and determines with her chosen left-right-decision your payoff
in the role of being the passive agent. We make sure that no two participants are
in a reciprocal relation of being an active decision maker and a passive agent for
the same person.
Your total payoff from the 1st part of the experiment is calculated by adding
the payoffs from the situations in which you were the active decision maker and
the passive agent.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of the supervisors will
come to you and answer your questions. If you do not have further questions,
please start and make your decisions between the left and right options.
AppendixA.3. Instructions, Part 2
In the 2nd part of the experiment, the participants are divided randomly
into groups of 5 members, which means that, besides you, there are four more
members in your group. The decisions of the other groups do not have an effect
on your group. Identities of the participants are never revealed. Your decisions
are anonymous, even within your group.
The participants of each group are assigned into roles A, B, C, D, and E.
Participants A, B, and C form the subgroup “blue.” Participants D and E form
the subgroup “green.” The roles differ in whether they win or lose through a
reform. The following rules apply:
• Participants in roles A and B lose through the reform and remain in the
subgroup “blue.”
48
• The participant in role C wins through the reform and switches in the
subgroup “green.”
• Participants in roles D and E win through the reform and remain in the
subgroup “green.”
Two Rounds of Voting. You and your other group members decide on the imple-
mentation of the reform. There are two votes. The reform will only be imple-
mented if the majority of your group decides to implement it in the second vote
(at least three participants have to choose “YES” in the second vote). Otherwise,
the reform will be rejected.
Information for the first vote:
• Before the voting takes place, you will be informed about the subgroup
(“blue” or “green”) to which you belong.
• If you belong to subgroup “blue” (participants A, B, and C), you do not
know whether you will win or lose following the reform. That is, you do not
know whether you are in the role of player C, who will turn into a “green”
subgroup member after the reform. Roles A, B, and C are equally probable.
So if you belong to subgroup “blue,” you belong with 2/3 probability to
the losers (A and B) and with 1/3 probability to the winners (C) from the
reform.
• If you belong to subgroup “green” (D and E), you are guaranteed to win
through implementation of the reform.
• If at least three participants in your group vote YES, the reform is accepted
provisionally. In this case, the C player‘s identity is revealed to the members
of subgroup “blue,” who turns into a member of subgroup “green,” and who
stays in subgroup “blue” (A and B).
Figure 2 [1 in the instructions] shows the decision screen for the 1st vote on
the reform, as you will soon see in the experiment. The table shows the income
of the participants before the reform (middle row) and after the reform (bottom
row). Before the reform, all participants have an income of 240 points. After
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the reform, participants in roles A and B receive 171 points each and those in
roles of C, D, and E receive 366 points each. The colored numbers show that
the participant in role C turns into a member of subgroup“green” through the
reform.
Insert Figure 2 here.
In the example displayed in Figure 2 [1], a screen for a participant belonging
to subgroup “blue” is shown. (The screen for subgroup “green” looks similar).
Remember that participants belonging to subgroup “blue” do not know at the
time of the first vote whether they are given role A, B, or C. To enter your
decision, press YES or NO and confirm by pressing OK.
Information on the 2nd Voting.
• If the majority of your group has voted against the reform in the first
vote, you and the other participants will decide again on exactly the same
reform proposal. You will see the same decision screen as in the 1st vote
(Figure 2 [1]) again. As before, participants belonging to subgroup “blue”
(participants A, B, and C) do not know who among them will win or lose
through the reform.
• If your group has provisionally accepted the reform in the 1st vote, you and
the other participants will now decide on whether to withdraw the reform.
Please note: Participants A and B from subgroup “blue” and participants
D and E from subgroup “green” stay in their respective subgroups. Partic-
ipant C finds out that (s)he switches from “blue” to “green.” If your group
decides to withdraw the reform in this situation in the 2nd vote, each par-
ticipant would receive his or her initial income of 240 points. Participant C
has moved from subgroup “blue” to subgroup “green,” meaning that sub-
group “green” now forms a majority that would lose from withdrawing the
reform.
• If at least three participants in your group vote for the reform in the first
vote and against its withdrawal in the 2nd vote, the reform will be finally
accepted. Participants in roles A and B will receive a payoff of 171 points
50
each and those in roles C, D, and E will receive 366 points each. Otherwise,
the reform is repealed and each participant will receive a payoff of 240
points.
Figure 3 [2 in the instructions] shows the decision screen for the 2nd voting
on the withdrawal of the reform, as you will see in the experiment, if your group
has provisionally accepted the reform in the 1st vote. The example shows the
screen for a participant in role C in subgroup “green.” Note that at the time of
the 2nd vote this and the other participants in subgroup “green” know their roles
and that they would lose from withdrawing the reform.
Insert Figure 3 here.
Summary. Only the outcome of the 2nd voting is relevant to your payoff. For
example, if your group decides against the reform in the first vote, but agrees on
it in the 2nd vote, all group members are paid on the basis of their incomes after
the implementation of the reform. The only aspect that changes between the 1st
and 2nd voting is that if a majority of your group chooses YES in the first vote,
a majority of participants (C, D, and E in the subgroup “green”) will lose from
withdrawing the reform.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait quietly until some-
one comes to you.
AppendixA.4. Instructions, Part 3
. . . Now we start with the 3rd part of the experiment. In this part, you
can again earn some money. This part has no consequences for the payoff you
obtained from the other parts of the experiment.
In this part of the experiment, you choose between two options A and B for
10 different situations, which means you choose 10 times between options A and
B. Option A is always a safe payoff of a certain amount of points. Option B is
always exactly the same lottery.
The table below shows the 10 situations and the two options among which
you will have to choose. Either you see the table as indicated in Figure 4 [3 in
the instructions] or you see it in the reverse order. The presentation of the table
to you is randomized.
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Insert Figure 4 here.
Example: Option A in the 9th line is 112.5 for sure. Option B in the 9th line
is 5/10: 125 and 5/10: 0. If you select option A in the 9th line, you get a payoff
of 112.5. If you select option B in the 9th line, you will have, in 5 out of 10 cases
(50%), a payoff of 125, and in 5 of 10 cases (50%), a payoff of 0.
We ask you to decide for each of these following 10 situations between options
A and B. Please compare line by line options A and B and decide for each line
by clicking A or B.
Calculation of Payment from Part 3. Your payment from this part of the ex-
periment is determined as follows: The computer randomly selects one of the 10
situations. Your decision in this situation is relevant for your payoff. For example
you have decided for option B in the 2nd line and the computer randomly selects
the situation in line 2 as relevant for the payoff. With a probability of 5 out of 10
cases (50%), you will get 125 points as payment, and in 5 of 10 cases (50%), you
will get 0 points. You can imagine an urn filled with 5 white and 5 black balls
for playing out the lottery. When a blindfolded person grabs into the box and
draws a white ball, you will receive a payout of 125. If the drawn ball is black,
you will get 0 points. The drawing of the balls is automated in the experiment
and is performed by the computer.
The points are converted into Euros, as in the previous parts of the experi-
ment, according to the following exchange rate: 1 point = 0.04 Euros (100 points
= 4 Euros).
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait quietly until some-
one comes to you. If you have no further questions, then you can make the
selection of options A and B on the screen. After all participants have completed
the 3rd part of the experiment, all participants see their individual payoffs of all
three parts of the experiment, the total number of points, and thus, the total pay-
ment resulting from the addition of the three payments from the different parts
of the experiment. This screen is followed by a short questionnaire. Finally, you
will receive your payoff in cash and the experiment is finished.
Thank you for your participation.
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AppendixA.5. Questionnaire
In the questionnaire, we asked for the following information:
• Gender? [Female/Male]
• Religion? [Evangelic/catholic/others/no]
• Year of birth?
• Field of study?
• Semester?
• Are you risk-loving or risk-averse? [very risk-loving, risk-loving, risk-neutral,
risk-averse, very risk-avers]
53
AppendixB. Homogeneity Test
Insert Table 11 here.
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AppendixC. Social Preferences and Group Outcomes
G-Subjects
To see how group outcomes were affected by G-Subjects’ social preferences,
we compare the distribution of WTP a, our measure of inequality aversion, across
the group outcomes. We focus on the Certain Gain Treatment A:CG. In this
treatment, hypothesis HA:CG, holding that all 16 reforms should pass, was re-
jected because only 12 actually did. Let G+ (L+) and G− (L−), respectively,
denote a G-(L-)subject that approves (+) or disapproves (−) the reform in the
second and final votes. Ten times the voting outcome was exactly as predicted
(G+G+G+L−L−) and two times the reform received additional support by L-
subjects (G+G+G+L+L−). Four times the reform was rejected because one G-
subject voted against it (G−G+G+L−L−). The percentage of G-subjects exhibit-
ing aWTP a of greater than or equal to {−0.667,−0.5,−0.167, 0, 0.167, 0.5, 0.667}
is given by {100, 100, 97, 92, 75, 25, 8}% for approved reforms and
{100, 100, 100, 83, 83, 58, 41}% for disapproved reforms; that is, the latter (ex-
cept for WTP a = 0) first order dominates the former with respect to inequality
aversion. A t-test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of means (t = 2.201,
p = 0.057); the same applies to a Mann-Whitney-U-test (Z = 1.906, p = 0.057).
Hence, we register inequality aversion inG-players in Table 8 as a valid individual-
level explanation of the rejection of HA:CG.
L-Subjects
We again compare the de-cumulative distributions of social preferences, this
time with regard to L-subjects’ WTP d. We start with HA:EL1 in the first vote
of A:EL. Let G+ (L+) and G− (L−) denote a G-(L-)subject that approves
(+) or disapproves (−) the reform in the second and final votes, respectively.
We consider four reforms that were rejected by all L-subjects according to the
prediction (G+G+L−L−L−), and 12 reforms that were either accepted (ten) or
rejected (two), where at least one L-subject voted yes, this is (G+G+L+L?L?)
and (G−G+L+L?L?). The percentage of L-subjects exhibiting a WTP d score
greater than or equal to {−0.667,−0.5,−0.167, 0, 0.167, 0.5, 0.667} is given by
{100, 83, 75, 67, 67, 33, 0}% and {100, 100, 89, 67, 64, 8, 0}%, respectively. How-
ever, we do not see here a clear dominance relationship. Furthermore, the null
55
hypothesis of average inequality aversion being equal in both groups of L+/L−-
subjects cannot be rejected (t = 0.117, p = 0.455; Z = 0.648, p = 0.258,
one-tailed). The mean inequality aversion of L+-subjects WTP
d
L+ = 0.104
(se = 0.074) exceeds L− with WTP
d
L− = 0.016 (se = 0.061) as expected, but due
to the relatively high variance in the data, this test is insignificant too (t = 0.876,
p = 0.193; Z = 0.417, p = 0.404, one-tailed). Here, we are in a dilemma: The
pure treatment effect of uncertainty (the prospect of gaining from the reform)
seems to dominate here in such a way that neither noisy play nor efficiency pref-
erences alone can accurately explain the high number of accepted reforms in the
first vote of the Expected Gain Treatment. Therefore, we add to Table 8 the
conclusion that efficiency preferences and noisy play together can only partially
explain why HA:EL1 was rejected.
Analogously, we observed four reforms that were accepted in the Certain Loss
Treatment, B:CL; there were five yes votes of L-subjects in this treatment. The
yes votes and the group outcome of the second vote can be explained by a high er-
ror rate (Tables 3 and 6). Again, we compared the de-cumulative distributions of
efficiency preferences WTP d for those cases, where at least one L-subject voted in
favor of the reform (G+G+L+L−L−) (four accepted) and (G+G−L+L−L−) (one
rejected) with the reforms that turned out as predicted (G+G+L−L−L−) (eleven
rejected): {100, 100, 93, 60, 53, 0, 0}% vs. {100, 94, 85, 61, 55, 6, 0}%. The com-
parison is ambiguous due to some L−-subjects exhibiting relatively high efficiency
preferences in the second vote. The mean difference of WTP
d
is insignificant as
well: WTP
d
L+ = 0.100 (se = 0.067) vs. WTP
d
L− = 0.004 (se = 0.042) (t = 0.768,
p = 0.223; Z = 0.813, p = 0.208, one-tailed). A closer look at L-subjects’ vot-
ing behavior shows that all L-subjects who voted for the reform in the first (or
second) vote were inconsistent, that is, they voted no in the second (first) vote.
Hence, we conclude that the rejection of HB:CL is due to noisy play (and social
preferences do not play a significant role here).
Next, we turn to HA:EL2, which holds that once-accepted reforms do not
get revoked in the Expected Loss Treatment (where a single L-player joins the
subgroup of G-players after the reform, which is denoted by L → G hereafter).
Table 3 shows that eight of the ten reforms sustained and the remaining two
could be explained by relatively high error rates. Since ten reforms were passed,
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ten L-players turned into G-players. Seven (three) of them had voted yes (no)
in the first vote; eight (two) voted yes (no) in the second vote; all seven who
had voted yes in the first vote remained consistent. Hence, the rejection of the
hypothesis is due to the three L→ G-subjects that had been against the reform
in the first vote. Only one of them switched to his “true” G-role and approved
the reform in the second vote. The other two L→ G-subjects remained in their
L-roles and revoked the reform. Two out of three would require an enormous
individual error rate. Comparing these three subjects’ WTP a shows that both
subjects who declined their L→ G-roles exhibit WTP a = 0.667, while the other
subject exhibits only WTP a = 0.167. The former figure significantly exceeds the
sample’s average degree of inequality aversion (t = 26.089, p ≤ 0.01), while the
latter falls significantly short of it (t=-3.625, p ≤ 0.01). Hence, we conclude that
the rejection of HA:EL2 is only due to inequality aversion on behalf of L → G
subjects.
Hypothesis HB:EG holds that an accepted reform is revoked in the Expected
Gain Treatment, since the majority loses with the reform (which establishes status
quo bias). Only one of the eight accepted reforms did not get revoked, and
the estimated error rate was fairly low (4.8%) (Table 3). Remember that the
Expected Gain Treatment begins with four L-players and only one G-player. If
a reform passes in the first vote, there will be three L-players, one L → G-
subject, and one original G-subject. Hence, L-subjects held the majority and
are expected to revoke the reform, unless they are efficiency loving (or commit
errors). Twenty four L-subjects remained in their L-roles after acceptance of the
reform by a majority; we denote them by L → L. Sixteen of them had voted
yes before and all of them voted no in the second vote, as predicted. Eight had
voted no before and seven of them stayed consistent. Only one of these eight
L → L subjects switched to yes and was actually responsible for acceptance of
the reform (a second reform was also accepted, but is beyond the scope of the
hypothesis). Assuming an individual error rate of εˆ = 0.078 would be sufficient
to explain this result. It is a bit problematic to explain this result, which is based
on a single inconsistent subject (no in the first and yes in the second vote) by
efficiency preferences (WTP d = 0.167 is significantly above the sample mean of
0.039, t = 8.219, p ≤ 0.01). Hence, we conclude that rejection of HB:EG can be
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explained by noisy play and/or efficiency preferences without being exceptionally
certain that the latter statement is valid.
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